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It is a familiar story. Following every economic crisis, policy-makers hurry 
back to their drawing boards to rethink and redraw the rules governing both 
the national and international economic order. This task has now acquired 
renewed urgency given the severe devastation meted by the current global 
financial meltdown. Indeed, crises create their own dynamic and offer rare 
opportunity to think outside the box. This is clearly happening now: estab-
lished orthodoxies are being vigorously challenged and bold new “lessons” 
prescribed that are so unprecedented in scope that they were simply unthink-
able just a few months ago. Economics Nobel laureates, Joseph Stiglitz and 
Paul Krugman, among many others, have already concluded that the era of 
laissez-faire economics and the free-market capitalism it ushered in is now 
over and that prudence dictates greater government regulation and over-
sight.2  Even in the United States – the bastion of free-market capitalism – ideas 
long considered anathema such as government involvement in the economy, 
including the nationalization of troubled banks and financial institutions, 
are now considered mainstream.3  Of course, behind this narrative is the 
larger story: namely, that the hands-off American or “Anglo- Saxon” model 
of regulation (or “regulation-lite”) has failed with disastrous consequences 
and needs to be replaced with clearer regulatory and supervisory rules and 
laws that can more effectively govern financial markets and institutions at 
both the national and international levels. Ian Bremmer captures this senti-
ment lucidly when he notes that
[T]he free-market tide has now receded. In its place has come 
state capitalism, a system in which the state functions as the 
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Although greater 
regulatory oversight 
is necessary over 
both financial 
markets and 
financial institutions, 
policymakers 
must be extremely 
careful not to cross 
the line where 
regulations become 
too restrictive and 
an impediment 
to innovation and 
entrepreneurship. 
leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political 
gain…. Now, the champions of free trade and open markets 
have to prove these systems’ value to an increasingly skepti-
cal international audience…. In the United States, lawmakers 
have intervened in the economy despite the public’s historic 
mistrust of government and its faith in private enterprise”.4
Yet, even if one agrees that prudence re-
quires support for greater regulation and 
oversight of financial markets, the specifics 
remain contested – in part, because the crisis 
was the result of both market and govern-
ment failure.5  For example, what should 
this regulation entail? Who should make the 
rules and regulations?  Who should have 
the authority of supervision, implementa-
tion and monitoring compliance?  What is 
the most efficacious way to integrate and 
coordinate the various domestic or national 
rules with an overarching international reg-
ulatory and supervisory system? No doubt, 
these exceedingly complex and important 
questions demand careful deliberation, as 
the stakes are too high to do any less. The 
following pages argue that although greater 
regulatory oversight is necessary over both 
financial markets and financial institutions, 
policymakers must be extremely careful not 
to cross the line where regulations become 
too restrictive and an impediment to in-
novation and entrepreneurship. Politicians 
and policymakers must resist knee-jerk temptation to use the proverbial 
sledgehammer to reform markets; rather, the surgeon’s scalpel is a more ap-
propriate tool. While it may be more time-consuming and not always garner 
political brownie points for politicians and policymakers eager to show their 
resolve to an impatient and angry public, a balanced and nuanced reform 
agenda that strengthens market incentives will pay greater long-term divi-
dends. It is essential that instead of succumbing to the currently prevalent 
“anti-market” sentiment, the United States must play a lead role in reforming 
the current international economic order. The United States is not only the 
world’s largest economy with a range and depth that no other can match, 
the American economy has repeatedly demonstrated a remarkable ability to 
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recover and lead. America’s distinguished history of scientific and techno-
logical innovation that has generated tremendous worldwide prosperity was 
fundamentally due to its commitment to a free-market system. The current 
crisis provides an opportunity for the United States and the G-20 countries 
to create a more balanced and equitable economic order.
Smart, Not Heavy-Handed Regulation
Historically, crises provided opportunities for policymakers to profoundly 
restructure the economy – sometimes for the better. In the United States, 
the panic of 1907 led to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the creation of 
the Federal Reserve as the central bank. The Great Depression of the 1930s 
led to the Glass-Steagall Act that established the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and prudent separation of the commercial from investment 
banking. More recently, the crisis in the late 1980s led to the enactment of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 
1991, which established clearer standards for bank supervision, regulation 
and capital requirements. While the current financial crisis has shown that 
greater regulatory oversight is needed, the palpable pro-government and 
anti-market sentiment - not only in the United States but around the world - is 
troubling. It is important that policymakers strike a proper balance between 
these two models because over-regulation of markets would have long-term 
disastrous consequences.  
There is much truth in the oft-noted cliché that to over-regulate markets is to 
slowly stifle and eventually destroy. Specifically, to make a market completely 
safe (that is, to remove all risk) would mean curtailing its dynamism and 
innovation. As Adam Smith pointed out centuries ago, without risk-taking 
and competition there is no market economy and no capitalism – and history 
and experience tell us that there is no alternative to capitalism. It is the only 
economic system that can create and allocate wealth efficiently and distribute 
the fruits of growth more widely and evenly. China and India are concrete 
testimony to the power of the free market’s ability to lift millions of people 
out of poverty and enable millions more to dramatically improve their living 
standards in less than a generation.6  However, what makes market econo-
mies so dynamic also makes them susceptible to excess and cycles of boom 
and busts. Bordo and Eichengreen have identified some 139 financial crises 
between 1973 and 1997 (of which 44 took place in high-income countries), 
compared with a total of only 38 between 1945 and 1971.7  This is because 
economic globalization has made markets even more volatile and unpredict-
able and the unprecedented changes in financial markets means that they 
may not always work as efficiently due to externalities, coordination failures, 
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information asymmetries, including well-placed firms and individuals using 
their power and privileged access for private gain.
Effective regulation and oversight can compensate for these inherent mar-
ket limitations both nationally and globally. In fact, a vast body of research 
confirms that financial markets function more efficiently when there is 
symmetry of information available to both buyers and sellers.8  Regulation 
and oversight to ensure timely disclosure and transparency can help reduce 
these information asymmetries and thereby the problem of systemic risk. 
This is even more important now, as financial innovation and integration 
have exponentially increased the speed and extent to which shocks can be 
transmitted across asset classes and economies throughout the world. Yet, 
much of the prudential regulation and supervision remain largely geared at 
individual financial institutions and do not adequately factor in the systemic 
and international implications of domestic institutions’ actions. The current 
crisis, for example, vividly underscores that not only were many of the highly 
structured financial products far from transparent and the disclosure of their 
originators often lacking, the weak regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
in the United States (but, also in other advanced economies), failed to prevent 
excessive risk-taking by market participants.9  Clearly, regulation (both at 
the national and international levels) that places constraints on imprudent 
individual behavior and prevents the build-up of dangerous speculative 
bubbles makes sense.10  Of course, the national regulatory structures need to 
be adequately aligned with the regulatory mechanisms at the global level.11
The crisis also underscores that current macro-prudential tools do not suf-
ficiently take into account business and financial cycles. This failure led to 
an excessive buildup of leverage. Although a feature that the current crisis 
shares with previous ones is the apparent fragility of the financial system 
(with a build-up of leverage in good times when investors tend to underes-
timate risk and the subsequent unwinding of this leverage when conditions 
deteriorate), this crisis is also unique for the key role of assets that are held 
off banks’ balance sheets and the extent to which credit problems have af-
fected the liquidity of the entire financial system. This not only means that 
credit rating agencies need to more clearly differentiate structured products 
from more standard financial instruments in their assessment of risks; market 
participants also need more information and transparency to better price risk 
and reduce uncertainty at times of market disruption. Thus, it is essential to 
establish rules and regulations that reduce systemic risks and improve finan-
cial intermediation without imposing unnecessary bureaucratic red tape. In 
particular, more transparent capital and liquidity requirements for financial 
institutions and more accessible data on over-the-counter derivatives and 
Winter 2010 104
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-CRISIS WORLD
minimum capital requirements that cover all financial assets and organiza-
tions would greatly enhance the resilience of financial institutions and reduce 
reckless risk-taking as it provides better information to market participants 
regarding assessments of systemic risks. Put more bluntly, regulators must 
impose stronger capital requirements and limit the ability of the banking and 
financial sector - including the so-called “shadow banking system” made up 
of investment banks and financial insurance providers such as AIG - to make 
risky investment bets with borrowed money. Additionally, regulators must 
be given enhanced authority to regulate hedge funds and private equity 
firms and to oversee consumer protection – especially in regards to consumer 
financial products such as mortgages and credit cards.12
How best to respond to the growing public demand for more and tougher (if 
not punitive) regulation? Although, the unprecedented pace of change in the 
financial markets makes it difficult for the bureaucratic world of regulation 
and supervision to keep pace, it is important to keep in mind that the U.S. 
financial services industry is not without its fair share of laws and regula-
tions. In fact, numerous laws and micro-prudential regulations are already 
on the books and a plethora of government agencies, notably the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in America and its British equivalent, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), have significant powers to implement 
and supervise these rules. Of course, we now know that the SEC was asleep 
at the wheel – not only failing in its responsibilities to regulate investment 
banks, but also in reining-in grossly fraudulent activities by the likes of Ber-
nard Madoff. Arguably, if the SEC followed-up only half of the prudential 
rules already on the books – that is, carried out effective implementation and 
supervision - serious problems could have been mitigated. 
However, what must be avoided is politically driven legislation and punitive 
overregulation. Rather, targeted supervision in the area of intermediation 
to guarantee effective reconciliation of the economic needs of businesses 
and individuals for long-term credit on predictable terms is critical. To the 
authorities in charge of banking regulations, this means that if a bank is 
“irresponsible” they should require the bank to take immediate corrective 
measures, and if it does not, they must close the bank, and if the bank is too 
large to fail, it should be taken over by the authorities.13  This would go a 
long-way in instilling confidence. Similarly, policymakers must avoid indis-
criminate regulations. Rather, they need to double their efforts to identify 
the core market imperfections that gave rise to the incentives for excess risk-
taking. Strengthening and streamlining the prudential oversight of financial 
and capital markets and enhancing transparency of market instruments and 
transactions would go a long way to mitigate future problems. Moreover, in 
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the United States and elsewhere, there needs to be greater regulatory over-
sight of the financial system - including strict federal rules for hedge funds, 
credit rating agencies and mortgage brokers - as well as transparency over 
the use (or more aptly misuse) of complex financial instruments, such as 
over-the-counter derivatives (including credit default swaps), that triggered 
the current crisis. At a minimum, elimination of conflicts of interest - such as 
those originating at credit rating agencies that gave top investment grades 
to the ultimately shaky financial instruments - need to be checked, and there 
must be both enhanced disclosure and increased capital requirements for 
banks providing credit to hedge funds. 
To its credit, on July 21, 2009, the Obama administration finally proposed legis-
lation to better regulate the rating agencies. If this proposal is made into law, it 
will create greater transparency and mitigate the conflicts of interest by requir-
ing rating agencies to disclose their fees, ratings history and methodologies 
for how they reach their conclusions. Perhaps most important, the proposed 
legislation forbids these agencies from doing consulting work for their clients. 
The latter is essential to prevent “ratings shopping”, while greater disclosure 
rules will make it easier for investors to hold these agencies accountable.
Financial Regulation in a Globalized Economy
Completely shielding national financial systems from the recurrent bouts 
of speculative excesses and painful economic contractions is not going to 
be easy given the internationalization of financial markets. The crisis has 
painfully shown that the existing international regulatory agencies are far 
behind in keeping up with market innovations and must be strengthened if 
they are to be effective. For example, in order to reduce market distortions 
and improve transparency and risk management, the supervisory and regu-
latory frameworks must require more transparent disclosure and reporting 
rules and must be globally coordinated to ensure effective supervision. Such 
comprehensive harmonization of national and international regulations and 
the consolidation of surveillance and supervision will make implementation 
and enforcement much easier as it reduces incentives for banks and finan-
cial institutions to move their operations off-shore to more lax jurisdictions. 
Clearly, international bodies, including the International Monetary Fund, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the Financial Stability Board, and 
various “standard setting” bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the International 
Accounting Standards Board, must further harmonize their rules and regu-
lations for more effective supervision and implementation.
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During their April 2009 meeting, the G-20 countries adopted the “Declaration 
on Strengthening the Financial System” or “G-20 Action Plan” consisting of 
“47 concrete measures designed to reform all systemically important finan-
cial institutions and instruments based on five principles”: strengthening 
transparency and accountability; enhancing sound regulation; promoting 
integrity in financial markets; reinforcing international cooperation; and re-
forming international financial institutions.14  Table 1 provides an overview 
of the core regulatory measures.
No doubt, these ambitious and appropriate measures, if effectively imple-
mented, will go a long way in mitigating future crises. However, the G-20 
declaration does not adequately spell-out the implementation mechanism. 
Rather, its recommendations seem to suggest reliance on voluntary and 
self-regulatory approaches instead of obligatory rules and regulations. This 
is unfortunate because many of the reform measures articulated in the G-20 
declaration have long been noted in official documents of the Financial 
Stability Forum and the Basel Committee of Banking supervision but were 
never seriously implemented given their voluntary nature. Moreover, since 
the implementation of such an ambitious agenda will take time, policymak-
ers should emphasize the most pressing aspects first. For example, requiring 
banks and financial institutions to set aside more capital against complex 
structured products and provide more disclosure on their off-balance sheet 
vehicles, including securitized products, should be at the top of the agenda. 
This crisis has also painfully demonstrated that both nationally and inter-
nationally, significant weaknesses remain in the areas of crisis preparedness 
and contingency response. Here, multilateral financial institutions like the 
IMF and the World Bank can play a significant role in reducing these risks. 
However, if these institutions are to be effective in responding to a global 
crisis, their lending capacity needs to be enhanced and emerging economies 
given more influence and voting power. At the outset of the crisis, John 
Lipsky, the IMF’s Deputy Director called for a doubling of the Fund’s lend-
ing capacity to $500 billion; interestingly, a number of developing countries 
saw this request as too modest and called for a tripling of the resources.17 
This may seem counterintuitive as developing countries have long accused 
the IMF of having too much power and influence over their domestic poli-
cies. However, this crisis has created strange bedfellows. Specifically, as the 
resultant global credit crunch dried up private capital flows to developing 
countries, monies from agencies like the IMF and the World Bank are once 
again in high demand. Facing a real prospect of being shut out of international 
capital markets, many developing countries, especially the Least Developed 
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Table 1: The G-20 “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System”15 
Financial Stability Board
• Establish, as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), a new Financial Stability Board 
with greater capacity, expanded participation, and a stronger mandate for promoting financial 
stability16 
International cooperation
• Complete the creation of supervisory colleges for significant cross-border firms in 2009
• Implement the FSF principles for cross-border crisis management
• Support efforts to develop an international framework for cross-border bank resolution
• Prudential regulation
• Maintain current international standards for minimum capital levels until recovery is assured, 
but then strengthen them
• Once recovery is assured, increase buffers above regulatory minimums, enhance the quality of 
capital, and develop guidelines for the harmonization of the definition of capital and for minimum 
capital levels internationally
• Implement recommendations to mitigate procyclicality, including anticyclical buffers
• Supplement risk-based capital requirements with an appropriate leverage ratio
• Improve incentives for risk management of securitization
• Progressively adopt the Basel II capital framework in all G-20 countries
• Develop a global framework for promoting stronger liquidity buffers at financial institutions
Scope of regulation
• Amend regulatory systems for macro-prudential risks and develop suitable tools for control-
ling such risks
• Ensure that national regulators are able to gather relevant information on all material financial 
institutions, markets, and instruments to assess systemic risk
• Produce guidelines for assessing whether a financial institution, market, or instrument is sys-
temically important
• Require that hedge funds be registered and subject to oversight, including through disclosure 
to supervisors
• Require that institutions with hedge funds as counterparties have effective risk management
• Establish central clearing counterparties for credit derivatives that are subject to regulation
• Regularly review boundaries of the regulatory framework and promote good international 
practices
Compensation
• Endorse and ensure significant progress in implementing the FSF principles on pay and com-
pensation in significant financial institutions by the 2009 remuneration round
• Require supervisors to monitor firms’ compensation policies and intervene where necessary 
Tax havens and non-cooperative jurisdictions
• Encourage all jurisdictions to adhere to international standards on combating tax evasion, money 
laundering, and terrorist financing
• Develop a toolbox of effective countermeasures for non-cooperative jurisdictions
Accounting standards
• Reduce the complexity of standards for financial instruments and improve standards for pro-
visioning, off-balance-sheet exposures, and valuation uncertainty
• Strengthen accounting recognition of loan loss provisions by including more credit information
• Achieve clarity and consistency in the application of valuation standards internationally
• Make progress toward a single set of global accounting standards
• Improve the involvement of stakeholders in the process of setting accounting standards
Credit rating agencies
• Subject all credit rating agencies whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes to oversight 
that includes registration and is consistent with the International Organization of Securities Com-
missions (IOSCO) Code of Conduct Fundamentals
• Ensure that national authorities enforce compliance by credit rating agencies and require changes 
to their practices when needed
• Require that credit rating agencies differentiate ratings for structured products and provide 
full disclosure of their ratings track record and the information and assumptions underpinning 
the rating process
• Review the role of external ratings in prudential regulation and address any adverse incentives.
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Countries, had little option other than financing from these multilateral 
financial institutions.18 
Therefore, this crisis has underscored the necessity of an official emergency 
lender (or a “lender of last resort”) which can act expeditiously to provide 
liquidity to calm panicky global markets. By all accounts the International 
Monetary Fund has proven to be an effective crisis-responder. Although it 
was ultimately the G-7 and G-20 decision to dramatically increase the IMF’s 
lending capacity to $750 billion (a threefold increase from the pre-crisis pe-
riod), which in turn, enabled the Fund to provide the much-needed liquidity 
for a global fiscal stimulus, it is important to note that it was the IMF which 
presciently advocated the need for “coordinated global fiscal stimulus” long 
before the idea became fashionable. In the end, the IMF’s action, coupled with 
the resolve and confidence with which it has responded to the crisis, proved 
critical in arresting the financial panic and global economic meltdown.19  The 
Fund should now utilize its new-found respect and legitimacy to champion 
the need for a more balanced global growth. In particular, as the markets 
stabilize and economic activity picks-up, the IMF must do more than simply 
dole out money; it should be proactive in preventing the build-up of global 
financial imbalances (i.e. the huge international reserves in emerging coun-
tries and massive deficits in rich nations) that contributed much to this crisis. 
Of course, for the IMF to be a truly global lender, the voice and representation 
of the emerging and developing economies, including the poorest nations, 
must be significantly increased. The IMF and other multilateral economic 
organizations must reflect the changes in the world economy if it is to ef-
fectively respond to global challenges.
Similarly, it is also in the common interest of the G-20 to counter the growing 
forces of protectionism, especially in the advanced economies. Among other 
things, this means that the United States, the EU, China, India and Brazil 
put aside their largely narrow differences and salvage the Doha Round of 
trade negotiations. The failure of Doha has the potential to reduce world 
trade by billions of dollars, especially if countries abandon the voluntary 
tariff restraint. India, and to a lesser extent, China - who bear much respon-
sibility for bringing the Doha round to an abrupt end in summer of 2008 by 
insisting on protecting their farmers through tariffs - will need to be more 
flexible if Doha is to be concluded. It also means that the Obama administra-
tion, in charge of the world’s largest economy, must end the ambivalence 
and stop sending mixed signals regarding its commitment to free trade. Its 
practice of acknowledging on one hand the benefits of trade, while on the 
other, criticizing free trade is counter-productive when knee-jerk protection-
ist and nationalist sentiments are running high. The U.S. administration can 
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allay these concerns by declaring unambiguously that any U.S. government 
bail-out programs and subsidies will be WTO-consistent. Failure to do this, 
especially with the “Buy American” provisions in the economic stimulus 
program and the recent politically-motivated tariffs on Chinese-made tires, 
has the potential to lead to the kind of tit-for-tat protectionism that helped 
deepen the Great Depression. More substantively, for Doha to progress, the 
U.S. and the EU must make meaningful reductions in its support of trade 
distorting agricultural subsidies. Of course, this is now a challenge as gov-
ernments throughout the world are forced to increase support payments to 
farmers with the collapse of global commodity prices. In addition, in the spirit 
of cooperation, governments can better coordinate their stimulus packages. 
At a minimum, stimulus packages must be built around common principles 
of multilateralism and openness to trade, even if they differ in the details. 
Indeed, U.S. backing for a successful end of Doha will not only underscore its 
commitment to free trade, but adherence to an institutionalized rules-based 
trading system under the WTO will also mitigate the more subtle tricks - if 
not insidious protectionism - countries use to protect domestic industries.
Finally, the cost of fighting the crisis has been unprecedented. Public debt is 
rising as governments around the world are hemorrhaging red ink.20  The 
massive stimulus programs coupled with the upfront costs of financial res-
cues - including the recapitalization of banks, guarantees for troubled assets, 
and tax revenues lost from growing unemployment and falling output and 
asset prices - mean that fiscal deficits will increase. The IMF expects OECD 
countries’ combined fiscal deficit to rise to 7 percent of GDP in 2009 (from 
less than 2 percent in 2007), while emerging economies will see their budget 
surpluses grow into a deficit of 3 percent of GDP.21  In the United States, ac-
cording to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the 2009 federal deficit 
will grow to about $1.6 trillion or 11.2 percent of GDP – the highest since 
WWII.22  Although such massive deficit spending was deemed necessary to 
help revive the economy from recession (because prolonged recessions can 
have far more serious consequences than the fiscal bailouts designed to com-
bat them), public debt can only rise by so much without any implications.
In the United States, the cost of the stimulus packages and the bailouts for the 
financial system has already resulted in “trillion-dollar deficits.”  In the short 
term, if the government debt ratios increase sharply, it could lead to a sharp 
drop in the value of the currency and inflation -- with real consequences for 
many who have already seen their nest-eggs disappear. Over the long-term, 
it could potentially lead to a perpetual debt burden on future generations. 
Not surprisingly, the markets, especially foreign markets, are increasingly 
concerned about the growing debt and potential inflationary risks in the U.S. 
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To calm and reassure markets, the Obama administration must articulate a 
clear regulatory framework and the government’s likely exit strategy from 
the economy once the economy picks up.
Conclusion
During the midst of the great depression, John Maynard Keynes warned that 
free markets will not always “self-correct” and government intervention is 
necessary to protect the capitalist system against its own excesses.23  Currently, 
we are witnessing such a profound a crisis of confidence in capitalism that 
it has forced champions of laissez-faire to implement policies and programs 
that were simply unthinkable just weeks ago. Who could have imagined that 
the United States government would have intervened in markets by bail-
ing out private banks through recapitalizations, or buy assets directly from 
private firms with tax-payer dollars and provide blanket guarantees to bank 
deposits. Nevertheless, as Milton Friedman cautioned long ago: government 
intervention must be strictly regulated because over the long-term markets 
are far more efficient than bureaucrats.24  The United States – the champion 
of the post-war global economy – must continue to play an important role in 
the reconstruction for a more balanced and equitable international economic 
order. Y
- Mai Truong served as the lead editor of this article.
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